UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

HONORABLE BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN

V.

No. 22-11120

FINANCIAL EDUCATION SERVICES, INC., UNITED WEALTH SERVICES, INC., VR-TECH, LLC, VR-TECH MGT, LLC, CM RENT, INC., YOUTH FINANCIAL LITERACY FOUNDATION, PARIMAL M. NAIK, MICHAEL TOLOFF, CHRISTOPHER TOLOFF AND GERALD THOMPSON,

Defendants.	

HEARING ON MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Thursday, June 30, 2022

To obtain a certified transcript, contact:

Timothy M. Floury, CSR-5780

Official Court Reporter

Theodore Levin United States Courthouse

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Transcript produced using machine shorthand and CAT software.

Appearances:

Gregory A. Ashe Julia Heald Federal Trade Commission 600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20580 202.326.3719 On behalf of Plaintiff

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Lisa Messner & Helen Mac Murray Kerry L. Morgan Mac Murray & Shuster, LLP 6525 West Campus Oval #210 New Albany, OH 43054 614.939.9955 On behalf of Defendants

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David W. Warren 30665 Northwestern, #200 Farmington Hills, MI 48334 248.855.2233 On behalf of Defendants

Pentiuk, Couvreur 2915 Biddle Avenue, #200 Wyandotte, MI 48192 734.281.7100 On behalf of Defendants

ALSO PRESENT:

Patrick A. Miles, Jr. - Receiver Anthony C. Sallah David Hall

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EXHIBITS

Number Description Id'd Rcvd Vol.

None Marked, Offered or Received

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Detroit, Michigan

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Thursday, June 30, 2022

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11:08 a.m.

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5 6 THE CLERK: The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan is now in session. The Honorable Bernard A. Friedman presiding.

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THE COURT: Thank you. You may be seated.

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case in the morning and we have only one other case that we're

Okay. Excuse my attire. This afternoon -- we have this

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doing by Zoom. It's a case that we have in New York, so when

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we're through with this case, we're going to take my interns as

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because they have not had one yet. We didn't realize at the

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time that it was going to be so hot out so we may have to

well as my junior law clerk on a walking tour of Detroit

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divert to a little -- but some of the history of Detroit that

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they don't know, I thought it would be interesting to do today.

Anyhow, it's good to see everybody. And this is the

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And Detroit's a very interesting city and has lots of quirks.

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matter of the Federal Trade Commission versus Financial

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Education Services, et al., Case No. 22-11120.

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May we have appearances, please, starting with the Government plaintiff.

23 24

MR. ASHE: Gregory Ashe for the Federal Trade

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Commission.

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1	THE COURT: Okay. One more time.
2	MR. ASHE: Gregory Ashe for the Federal Trade
3	Commission.
4	THE COURT: Okay. Great. And?
5	MS. HEALD: And Julia Heald from the Federal Trade
6	Commission.
7	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much.
8	And for the defense, first starting with Financial
9	Education Services and any other ones that you may represent.
10	MR. EPSTEIN: Good morning, your Honor.
11	THE COURT: Morning.
12	MR. EPSTEIN: Richard Epstein, and with me is Matthew
13	Rapkowski for the defendants, Financial Education Services,
14	United Wealth Services, VR-Tech, LLC, Youth Financial Literacy
15	Foundation and Parimal Naik.
16	THE COURT: Thank you. And sitting next to
17	co-counsel, just so I have
18	MR. EPSTEIN: Matthew Rapkowski.
19	THE COURT: And right next-door to him.
20	MR. MORGAN: Thank you, your Honor. Kerry Morgan
21	appearing on behalf of defendant Gerald Thompson only, your
22	Honor.
23	THE COURT: Good. The reason I'm kind of going in
24	order is when we're going through, I'd know who's speaking and
25	who's representing who. Thank you.
	22-11120; FTC v. Financial Education Services, Inc., et al.

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1	Counsel?
2	MS. MESSNER: Thank you, your Honor. Lisa Messner
3	appearing on behalf of individual defendants Christopher and
4	Michael Toloff, on behalf of CM Rent, Inc., and on behalf of
5	VR-Tech MGT, LLC.
6	THE COURT: Thank you.
7	Counsel?
8	MR. FISH: Morning, your Honor.
9	THE COURT: Morning.
10	MR. FISH: George Fish on behalf of Financial
11	Education Services, Inc., United Wealth Services, Inc, VR-Tech,
12	LLC, Youth Financial Literacy Foundation and Parimal Naik. I'm
13	local counsel.
14	THE COURT: Nice to see you.
15	Counsel?
16	MS. MAC MURRAY: Good morning, your Honor. I'm
17	counsel with Lisa Messner for the same defendants, Michael and
18	Christopher Toloff, VR-Tech MGT, LLC, as well as CM Rent.
19	THE REPORTER: Could I get your name?
20	MS. MAC MURRAY: Helen Mac Murray.
21	THE REPORTER: Thank you.
22	MR. WARREN: Nice to see you, your Honor.
23	THE COURT: Nice to see you.
24	MR. WARREN: David Warren on behalf of Michael
25	Toloff, Christopher Toloff, VR-Tech Management and CM Rent.
	22-11120; FTC v. Financial Education Services, Inc., et al.

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I'm local counsel.

THE COURT: Thank you. Just so you know, I'm glad we have local counsel here. It's always nice to have local counsel; however, you're always Welcome to attend. From my experience sometimes that's all they're really doing is attending, and that's good, and that's what our rule requires. But in the future, if they -- if there's no reason to have them here, they may be excused, depending on each client and how each client feels about having local counsel present in the courtroom. I don't require your presence in the courtroom and -- but it's really up to the attorneys. I don't want to -- I don't want to interfere with anybody's practice or with the case at all. So all welcome. I see we have a lot of folks in the audience. Welcome, also.

We have a few matters up today. We have -- I suspect the most important one is whether or not we are going to continue the TRO to a preliminary injunction. We just received some -- as to the defendant's, certain defendant's requests for limited modification of the order, and those just came in two days ago, so I think that's what we have.

Starting with the plaintiff, is there anything else that we have before the Court that I have not indicated?

MR. ASHE: I think that's all, your Honor.

Also would just say, not on behalf of the Federal Trade Commission, but the court-appointed receiver and his counsel

Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction Thursday, June 30, 2022 Page 8 1 are also here. 2 THE COURT: Good. 3 Thank you. Where is the receiver? 4 Good. Tell us your name again. 5 MR. MILES: Your Honor, this is Patrick Miles, Jr. 6 I'm the court-appointed receiver. 7 THE COURT: Good. And with you? 8 I'm David Hall. MR. HALL: 9 MR. LEARY: Michael Leary (phonetic) of Riveron 10 (phonetic), financial advisor to the receiver. 11 THE COURT: And at the end? 12 MR. SALLAH: Anthony Sallah, your Honor, counsel for 13 the receiver. 14 THE COURT: Thank you. Okay. Okay. I read your 15 report last night. I assume that each side has received the 16 receiver's report. 17 Plaintiff, have you received it? 18 MR. ASHE: We have, your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Has each defendant received it? 20 MR. EPSTEIN: We have, your Honor. 21 MS. MAC MURRAY: Yes. 22 THE COURT: Okay. Good. I assumed you all did. 23 MR. EPSTEIN: Your Honor, there is one other 24 procedural matter for which I believe there is no dispute. 25 filed a motion to seal certain of the exhibits to the 22-11120; FTC v. Financial Education Services, Inc., et al.

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opposition memorandum that was filed on behalf of our clients because it contained personal financial information concerning the customers of several of the defendant companies.

THE COURT: Is there any objection?

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MR. ASHE: We have no objection to that.

THE COURT: I did not see that motion, but obviously if there's no objection, it makes some sense to me that it should be sealed, unless counsel has an objection.

MS. MAC MURRAY: I do not, but there was actually two motions to seal before you. One is with regards to the obligation of the trust.

MR. EPSTEIN: As I understand, your Honor --

THE COURT: Wait. Counsel didn't finish.

MS. MAC MURRAY: Thank you, your honor.

It's to seal the trust, the Gayle Toloff Revocable Trust, and there was no opposition by the FTC.

MR. ASHE: We had no objections.

THE COURT: Okay. Both motions to seal will be granted and will be sealed until further order of the Court because down the line we may have to unseal them, but since there's no opposition, we'll seal it until further order of the court.

MS. MAC MURRAY: Thank you.

MR. EPSTEIN: For purposes of the Court's review, the CM/ECF filings that were made were redacted pending a motion to

Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction Thursday, June 30, 2022 Page 10 1 seal. Accompanying the motion to seal, which was filed, 2 itself, in a sort of sealed --3 THE COURT: Right. 4 MR. EPSTEIN: -- fashion, the unredacted versions are 5 there, so for the benefit of the Court, those are the ones that 6 need to be substituted for --7 THE COURT: Yes. 8 MR. EPSTEIN: -- for the Court's review of the 9 documents. 10 THE COURT: Great. Good. 11 Okay. Any other housekeeping matters? 12 So I think this is the Government's request to Okay. 13 extend the -- or convert the TRO, so you may go first. 14 You may use the podium. It's funny being back in court, 15 we haven't been here in so long, and the time we were, we had 16 glass everywhere? 17 MR. EPSTEIN: Before we get started, would -- is the 18 Court's preference to use the podium or may I work from --19 **THE COURT:** You may work from there, absolutely. 20 It's not my preference, but I just wanted to make sure that it 21 was available, because for so long it has not been available 22 and so the --23 MR. EPSTEIN: If I could take 30 seconds. 24 I had my first hearing in person last week where I live in 25 Fort Lauderdale at -- in probably 16, 17, months, 18 months, 22-11120; FTC v. Financial Education Services, Inc., et al.

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and we were all there in person, the judge, the opposing counsel, all the lawyers that were involved, some other interested persons, everybody except the court reporter. The court reporter was going to attend by Zoom. Okay? This was last Tuesday. I don't know if anyone remembers, Zoom had outages last Tuesday, so we couldn't connect her, so all of this planning, all of these people showing up for the first time in a year and a half, hearing couldn't go forward because we couldn't get a court reporter, and, of course, there's no court reporters wondering around the courthouse.

THE COURT: Not anymore.

MR. EPSTEIN: Not anymore, you know, so -- we're
still not there yet.

and one of them is our sound system. Our sound system used to be great, it was the best one in the courthouse, and now -- we haven't had many in-court experiences, but now for some reason it's not working the way it should. We'll get them all out one of these days, but it is very nice to be back in court. I'm sure most of you feel the same way. And the first couple times we were in court we had glass, glass all over here, just like it is in the witness box. And in the jury box, we had a jury with glass all around them, you know. They were kind of like this, and we finally took it down and just forgot to take that one down. Hopefully COVID will slow down and we'll all be well

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and next year at this time it will be a long memory, that's all.

Counsel?

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MR. ASHE: I was just going to -- you were mentioning your walking tour. I run and I got up extra early to run on the Detroit RiverWalk. It's quite spectacular.

THE COURT: It's great.

MR. ASHE: Going through some of those urban parks as
you're running, I guess you're running north.

THE COURT: Oh, you went down to Davison cutoff. You're heading north, yeah, yeah.

MR. ASHE: Lovely trail.

THE COURT: I used to be a runner and we ran at noon for probably 20 years with my clerks and -- we ran all around Detroit. And I had one law clerk back then, and I said, look And she'd say, I'm going to be part of this having -at this. And we went up to neighbors -- and I said no way. revival. And this was 30 years ago. She was one of my first clerks. And we'd run every day and I'd say that. And it has really turned itself around. And every time I see her -- and she has been very much a part of it. She was a very active attorney; she was the U.S. Attorney for a while. She's teaching as a professor at Michigan now and so she had really -- it's unbelievable what's happened to her.

MR. ASHE: Yeah, it's great. I mean, it's a great

22-11120; FTC v. Financial Education Services, Inc., et al.

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way to see the city.

THE COURT: Yeah, you probably ran into Rachel.

Where's Rachel? She ran about 7:00 this morning. You may have run into her.

MR. EPSTEIN: Your Honor, we're not hearing Mr. Ashe particularly well. I don't know, maybe he needs to get closer to the mic.

MR. ASHE: Can you hear me now? I apologize.

THE COURT: No problem. If you can't hear anybody, including the people in the audience, raise your hands. Everybody's got to hear.

Okay. You may proceed.

MR. ASHE: Okay. May it please the Court, your Honor, Gregory Ashe for the Federal Trade Commission. As you know, we're here on the FTC's motion to convert the temporary restraining order that was entered in May into a preliminary injunction.

The defendants are masters at elevating form over substance, but the law looks to substance. The FTC has presented substantial evidence, both in its initial filing and in its supplemental briefing, which is corroborated by the receiver's preliminary report findings that the defendants first violated -- well, first -- the defendant's credit repair and investment opportunity scheme violated Section 5 of the FTC Act, the Credit Repair Organizations Act, also known as CROA,

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and the Federal Trade Commission's Telemarketing Sales Rule.

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In particular, the evidence has demonstrated that the FTC is likely to succeed on the merits in showing that the defendants, one, misrepresented the efficacy of the credit repair services; two, charged prohibited advance fees; three, failed to make critical and required CROA mandated disclosures; four, misrepresented the amount of income that their agents could earn by selling the opportunity; five, their investment opportunity was, in fact, an illegal pyramid scheme; and, six, that they provided the means and instrumentalities by providing marketing materials so that others could commit deceptive Second, the evidence shows that the corporate practices. defendants operated the scheme as a common enterprise, a fact which is not substantively disputed in the various opposition briefs; and, finally, that the individual defendants have the requisite degree of control and knowledge as laid forth in Sixth Circuit case law to make them liable for injunctive and monetary relief.

Accordingly, we believe that the entry of the preliminary injunction is appropriate, including continuing the asset freeze and of the receivership. And the FTC's legal arguments in the factual basis are presented in great detail in our TRO memo and the supplemental filing that we filed last night, so we're really here to answer questions that the Court may have to aid in its determination that the preliminary injunction

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should issue.

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We also do recognize that we filed a supplemental brief late last night.

THE COURT: I have it right here. I skimmed it.

MR. ASHE: I can highlight some of the key points, that is if the Court finds it helpful, otherwise we really -- we're here to serve as an aide to the Court in answering what questions that the Court may have.

THE COURT: I appreciate that. I have read everything I could find, except the motion's seal, I guess, you know, and I appreciate that.

At this point I'd like to hear from the other side and I may have some questions.

MR. ASHE: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Who's going to go first?

MR. EPSTEIN: I think I'm the first one in the barrel, your Honor, thank you.

THE COURT: Good.

MR. EPSTEIN: I do intend to speak much longer and anticipate some of your questions and hopefully answer them even before you've had a chance to ask them.

THE COURT: That's fine. I'm not limiting anybody, I just wanted to let you know I've read it, and please highlight those things that you believe should be highlighted. I have no

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problem with that.

MR. EPSTEIN: And, your Honor, if I may, I'm not sure I heard you correctly. Did you have an opportunity to read the reply memorandum that the Commission filed?

THE COURT: I did not read it, I skimmed it.

MR. EPSTEIN: Okay.

THE COURT: Just came out. My clerk just handed it to me this morning.

MR. EPSTEIN: Very good. I have no problem with that. Obviously, all of us were doing stuff that was probably not conducive to being the most effective advocates today in order to get caught up on all of that stuff.

I feel a different theme is -- is appropriate here.

Mr. Ashe has characterized our collective position over here and clients and parties as being masters of form over substance. Well, first of all, I don't think any of us will ever disagree that in the law, form is important, but here's the counterpoint I'd like to make. I think the real theme here is that the Federal Trade Commission is a master of ipse dixit. They have presented a narrative that they say exists but is belied by the record, is simply not supported by the record, and most importantly is actually not even supported by the receiver that you appointed early on in this case.

The receiver's report, read carefully, says very different things, sends very different messages than corroborating the

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notion that a company or a series of companies that have been actively doing business for nearly 20 years, that have serviced -- well, I did the math -- just since 2015, have enrolled 622,908 customers.

THE COURT: Where are you getting the math?

MR. EPSTEIN: Well, unfortunately, I didn't know that I needed to get 2015 through 2018 until last night about 11:00 when I got their brief. The 2019, '20 and '21 numbers are in everybody's papers. They're in the receiver's report.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. EPSTEIN: They're in our report. So in 2019, '20 and '21, the last three years which would have at least fit within the statute of limitations in Section 19, there's roughly 420,000 or so customers. There are -- I have this elsewhere -- roughly about 160,000, 170,000 agents, discrete people that these companies have serviced, so to say in broad-sweeping terms that this is widespread fraud, that this is a pyramid scheme, without taking into account the actual data that exists that could have allowed for an appropriate evaluation of the direct marketing plan, there simply is not a proper foundation to continue any sort of injunctive relief against any of the corporate parties in this action. course, if there's no immediate relief, interim or preliminary relief as to the corporate defendants, then, of course, the relief as to the individuals would necessarily fall because its

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derivative.

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So let me deconstruct that a little bit if we could. Their argument of widespread fraud in connection with the operation of the multilevel marketing plan is based upon their claim of misrepresentations regarding earning potential and then a declaration without meaningful support that it's a pyramid scheme. Well, as I'm sure the Court has recognized from the cases that have been already cited in the moving papers in this case, there is no difference in form between a pyramid scheme and a multilevel marketing plan. They are exactly the same form of organization. It's how it's used. It's how it operates that's important. And what is missing from the Commission's submissions? Why is it that this is a case of ipse dixit? There is no operational data, none, that concerns any of these companies that is figures in their assertion that it's a pyramid scheme or in the expert report of Dr. David Givens, who, let's just be clear, is employed by the Federal Trade Commission, so it's not exactly hard to see exactly what his opinion is going to be. You don't generally formulate opinions, you know, that offend your master if you intend to keep your job.

Nonetheless, I will give credit to Dr. Givens. He uses 40 some odd pages in as creative a manner as I can imagine, given that he has absolutely no data. He has no operational data, and the conclusion that one has to draw, that the Court has to

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be convinced of here that this is a pyramid scheme, is that it emphasizes the recruitment of agents over the sale of the product. That, if anything, is sort of the baseline element of a pyramid scheme: Recruitment for the business opportunity versus sale of the product.

One would seemingly want to know, how much revenue was generated by the sale of the product? How much revenue was generated by the sale of the business opportunity? They never asked. They never got it, because they didn't ask.

Based on the declarations that we have seen here -- and I'll get to those in a couple of minutes -- based on the declarations, they've been conducting an investigation of this company since at least 2020, if not earlier. It's 2 1/2 years now. Never sent out a CID to the company. Never sought operational data. They did get lots and lots of bank records. But the bank records only tells them money came in and money went out; it doesn't tell them where that money came from. It doesn't tell them the source of the money. It doesn't tell them whether this is from customers buying the product, which would -- which would suggest/indicate that this is a legitimate marketing -- multilevel marketing plan versus money coming from the sale of the business opportunity, which is one element of a determination it's a pyramid scheme.

Judge, it just isn't there. The report comes to the 22-11120; FTC v. Financial Education Services, Inc., et al.

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conclusion it's a pyramid scheme without knowing what the actual data would reveal on the central element in what a pyramid scheme is. They dance around while looking at the compensation arrangement, which everybody seemingly agrees is complicated, but then if all you're starting with is the contract and a schedule of how the agents get paid for selling the product, how they get paid, if at all for recruiting agents without knowing the success of each of those endeavors, you can't tell what the balance is, because it's not a fixed amount.

As Dr. Jovanovic points out, our expert rebuttal to Dr. Givens, there is no set standard. There is no bright line that anyone has drawn. The cases haven't drawn, and, importantly, the Federal Trade Commission has not drawn.

I want to be clear about this because this is a legal issue that goes to other parts of our argument. There is no rule implicated in a Section 5 case attacking a multilevel marketing plan. There is no rule. It is based on Section 5(a). Fine, that's not a problem. They have every right to bring a claim based on 5(a), and they have two ways of bringing it, under Section 13(b) or under Section 19(b). So -- which I'll, again, get to in a minute because that is a very important part of our argument.

What do we know about the multilevel marketing plan, how it operates? The only information -- I don't want to use the 22-11120; FTC v. Financial Education Services, Inc., et al.

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word "evidence" -- the only information you have before you are 15 declarations from actual customers of the corporate defendants. These are the first-party declarations, which I will observe. We appreciate the quick turnaround on the order on the motion to strike the other declaration I'll mention in a minute. We didn't move to strike those declarations because those are appropriately used. You know, they are first-party declarations. They were the actual declarant, you know, signing a statement of what they actually declared. 15 of those. Only one of them relates to conduct that actually occurred into 2021. All the other ones relate to conduct that occurred between 2000, as far back as '16, through 2020, so most of them are, if you will, ancient history.

There is another declaration, the one that we moved to strike, Elena Hoffman. She recites her recollection of interviews that she conducted sometimes a year, two years ago from people who had filed complaints typically with the Better Business Bureau. There are 11 of those to begin with, and a 12th arrived last night. I don't have it up in front of me, but I thought that the beginning of that recitation of that declaration -- what was the guy's name? Kendrick? The one from last night?

THE COURT: I haven't read the report.

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MR}}.$ $\ensuremath{\mathsf{EPSTEIN}}:$ Whatever. Ms. Hoffman starts out her written statement by --

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THE COURT: Fuller.

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MR. EPSTEIN: -- by saying -- by reciting that -- the husband is speaking, if I remember correctly. I can bring it up. I apologize for the imprecision -- husband is telling her in 2016 or '17 or 2017 and '18, my wife told me this.

So this is representative of the 11 other so-called witnesses that Ms. Hoffman presents. This is -- Ms. Hoffman talks to a man who is telling her about what his wife told him as long ago as five or six years. Now, how reliable can that be? How trustworthy can that be? And that is the, you know, the sort of the benchmark that we asked the Court to apply to at least the 11 other statements that Ms. Hoffman relates to This is her words, her recollection of what she was told by others, and in the main, almost every one of those statements said Jane told John told George who told me, and then that person told Ms. Hoffman, double, triple, quadruple hearsay. Yes, I understand, your Honor, and will not argue the point that it goes to the weight, it goes to the reliability, but there is a limit. There ought to be a line that is drawn, and this is beyond that line.

Those -- regardless of what they say, they really ought to be ignored because they cannot be relied on, and suggesting that they have the trustworthiness of residual hearsay under 807 is, in a word, laughable. I mean, I've litigated that issue extensively, and believe me, I can't get sworn testimony

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under oath admitted under the residual hearsay exception, much less this kind of double, triple and quadruple hearsay.

So I think our first point is there simply isn't a factual basis for continuing the preliminary injunction, because in order to continue the preliminary injunction, you're going to have to make a finding, and in particular with respect to the Credit Repair Organizations Act, that the defendants violated it, not that there is the potential of producing evidence that they violated, but they did violate it, because of the way CROA works, because of the issue with respect to CROA, which I'll turn to now.

The Federal Trade Commission has described this -- these companies as a credit repair scam. What they ignore is, well, basically, facts, facts that credit repair was one of one products that were sold to the customers, that there were six additional products that were sold to the customers, all of which products had utilization, all of which products had value. Was the lead product credit repair? Fine, yes, it was. Was much of the advertising geared toward that? In the main, it was, because it's really the starting point for the rest of the package. The rest of the bundle of services all relates to allowing the user to develop a better credit life, and that's what it was designed to do, education, other kinds of tools that would allow for not only the improvement of their credit standing through the credit repair, but also the development of

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better habits and better credit-related skills. And we, I think, supported that more than adequately with the 16 declarations that we submitted from customers who had quite a different story to tell about how the YFL and FES products improved their lives, changed their lives in many instances. There's a couple that I would just direct your attention to as being, in particularly, I think, not only moving stories, but representative of what has got to be a substantial population here.

Marlene Reyes, which is docket entry 51-13, Karaunda Hurt, H-u-r-t, docket entry 51-14, Robert Rodriguez, 51-15, Andrea McKeithern, 51-18, and Jennifer Stamm, 51-19, what they say is the counterpoint to what the FTC portrays their declarations as saying, but we know they do not, and we point this out repeatedly.

The FTC on the one hand presents at least two people who complain that the credit repair product didn't work. One of them stayed in the program for six weeks, the other one for two months. Well, I mean, I don't often use colloquialisms — actually, I do — but, duh. This is a program that takes time, and staying in it six weeks or two months is never going to achieve those results, and that was never — they were never misled about that.

The lead-off declaration they have, person never bought the product. Never bought the product. He came to the -- his 22-11120; FTC v. Financial Education Services, Inc., et al.

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own unique, individualized conclusion that this was perhaps a scam, maybe, but he never bought the product. How does that support any relief at all? There are plenty of people who aren't going to buy this product, but what we do know is that lots of people have.

Now, on the credit repair issue there is a legal issue that the Court needs to confront, and it creates, I think, the -- a basis for -- a second basis for denying the preliminary injunction here. YFL, the seller of the credit repair product and the entity that would be considered to be a credit repair organization under the Credit Repair Organizations Act is a Michigan not-for-profit corporation and it -- that has been given 501(c)(3) tax-free or tax-exempt status by the IRS. That is a fact. No one is disputing that. What is being disputed is not what it is, what is being disputed is how it operates, and the question that the IR -that the Commission has raised is not that it's a not-for-profit; it is a not-for-profit. I don't think they're disputing that. Not that the IRS has given it 501(c)(3) status; I don't think they dispute that, but whether it is, in fact, operating in a manner that justifies the tax exempt status that is bestowed upon it by virtue of the IRS's determination, which, by the way, your Honor, occurred in December of 2003. It's been a long time since this company's been a 501(c)(3), and it is, at least from the standpoint of

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its relationship with the Internal Revenue Service, it has done all of the things that are appropriate.

THE COURT: I think their position is not that, I think they're position is how it is being used --

MR. EPSTEIN: Yes, exactly, right.

THE COURT: -- opposed to its status and so forth.

It's the use of it and its relationship with the other entities, and that's, I think, what the whole subject of that is about. They don't believe --

MR. EPSTEIN: And that is -- I agree with you entirely, and that is exactly what I was about to say. It comes down to whether it is operating -- and I don't believe I'm misstating their position -- operating in a fashion that would entitle it to claim that tax exempt status. And there are a number of different tests that are applicable to that.

But here's the point: Assuming, which we will for purposes of today's hearing, that the Commission has standing to make that claim, we have argued that it really is up to the IRS, but for today's hearing alone without prejudice to our position, we'll accept that the Commission has the ability to challenge that aspect of it. I went through the other part to make sure that everyone knows all of those other statuses are etched in stone, if you will, so this is operational. This is, again, data-driven, which you do not have.

In order for you to decide if the business conducted, if 22-11120; FTC v. Financial Education Services, Inc., et al.

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the activities conducted by YFL fit within the framework of a tax-except entity, you need to know everything it does.

THE COURT: Well, I'm not -- first of all, you keep saying I have to decide. I can't decide. I'm not the ultimate decider of the facts here. My -- what I have to take into consideration are not necessarily definitive positions, No. 1, but more importantly, I think they're position, from the way I read it, is that even if they were not a nonprofit, the way it was being used, the way it was being used as a tool for the other -- the other entities, that's -- I think that's their main argument, if I'm not -- it could be the nonprofit, but I don't think that that's their --

MR. EPSTEIN: No, they -- well, they are definitely challenging --

THE COURT: Absolutely.

MR. EPSTEIN: -- the nonprofit status. They have to.

THE COURT: Because that changes the flow of their ability to do certain things if they're nonprofit.

MR. EPSTEIN: Well, it actually changes the law that's applicable, because it's --

THE COURT: That's true.

MR. EPSTEIN: If it is a not-for-profit tax-exempt entity under 501(c)(3) --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. EPSTEIN: -- then it is not and cannot be a 22-11120; FTC v. Financial Education Services, Inc., et al.

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credit repair organization; and if it is not and cannot be a credit repair organization, then CROA does not apply to it, and that means that the first three of the so-called violations that prompted this case, the efficacy of the credit repair product, the advance fees and the disclosures, the CROA disclosures, those would be inapplicable; that would not be a tool available to the Commission because YFL is not subject to CROA, and if CROA doesn't provide the framework for the enforcement action here, then many of the other things that they're asking for necessarily fail.

And here's why you -- I agree with you, your Honor, there's -- this is very factual. This is what lawsuits are This is what you go and you do discovery about made out of. and you go in and you do a, you know, a proctological examination of how the company operates and you present it to the Court and you say this is -- tilts on the other side of what a not-for-profit is supposed to do, but that's fact-driven, that's evidence-driven, that's data-driven, and you don't have any of that in front of you. Yet, if you do what the Commission is asking you to do, and that is continue the preliminary injunction, you are expressly finding that YFL is not exempt because there's no other way that you would have the authority to enter relief against it under CROA, and they are definitely asking for relief under CROA. So you -- the very act of doing what they're asking is a final determination

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of this case as it relates to YFL, because there's no way the injunction could ever have stood if CROA wasn't there.

So you have -- you know, so what we're basically suggesting is that this is a factual issue, and when there are material facts in dispute and there is not a clear path of undisputed facts that would suggest that the Commission, you know, has a likelihood of success on the merits, then the injunction cannot survive and it just becomes a case that the Commission is entitled to conduct all the discovery that they wish to do and present it to you in the ordinary course once the facts have been developed.

So asking for preliminary injunction essentially preempts the ability of YFL to defend itself, because it's already enjoined under a law that it ostensibly is exempt from, and you can't have it both ways.

THE COURT: And you also can't take them out. Say -because we have so many other entities that are connected. So
assuming you're right, we can't take YFL out. Assuming I said,
okay, we're going to extent it, but it won't apply to YFL. The
whole thing falls apart, anyhow.

MR. EPSTEIN: It depends on what kind of relief you're considering giving, so that I think is a good segue --

THE COURT: They're asking for permanent injunctive relief similar to that which was temporary. And if I were to take YFL out, say, okay, you're right, they're a nonprofit and,

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therefore, they have no jurisdiction, it wouldn't make any difference because the whole thing is based upon everybody together.

MR. EPSTEIN: Not quite.

THE COURT: Where am I wrong?

MR. EPSTEIN: Because of the basis for the relief that they're seeking. Now we're getting into AMG Capital.

The Supreme Court, a year ago, April of 2021, determined that the Federal Trade Commission does not have the authority under Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act to seek monetary relief. Why is that important here?

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. EPSTEIN: Because it now creates a divide between the two types of relief that have already been granted in this case. You've entered the temporary restraining order that recites a variety of conduct-related injunctive directives, affirmative and negative. Certainly 13(b) authorizes that. It's not a problem. We're not arguing to the contrary. Court has the authority to enter that kind of TRO that governs conduct, but you also imposed an asset freeze and you appointed a receiver.

The purpose of the asset freeze, and I will quote from the order, itself. First in finding of fact I -- this is docket entry 10, page 5 of the TRO -- and, remember, I'm sure this order was presented to you by the Commission.

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THE COURT: I didn't draft it.

MR. EPSTEIN: Yeah. "This Court has authority to issue this order pursuant to Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b); Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65; and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651."

That's fine. That's what you based your decision on because that's what the Federal Trade Commission told you they were basing their request on.

Note that there is no other cited authority in the body of the TRO to any other procedural or remedial basis for the issuance of this injunction. They've hung their hat on 13(b).

Then in Finding of Fact F, there is good cause to believe that immediate and irreparable harm to the Courts ability to grant effective final relief for consumers -- effective final relief for consumers, including rescission or reformation of contracts and the refund of money or return of property will occur from the sale transfer destruction or other disposition or concealment by defendants of their assets or records unless defendant are immediately restrained and enjoined by order of this Court.

So the order is --

THE COURT: What's wrong with that?

MR. EPSTEIN: There's nothing wrong with that, except that you're not authorized to -- you're authorized to issue an injunction that says, don't destroy your records. Okay?

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That's fine.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. EPSTEIN: Okay? But the only basis cited in the order for the asset freeze, which is a by-product of this provision, the only basis cited in the order for the asset freeze is rescission or reformation of contracts and refund of monies or property. This is monetary relief. That is what the Supreme Court in AMG Capital said you cannot do as a judge, what the FTC cannot ask for.

THE COURT: Read it one more time, please.

MR. EPSTEIN: What?

THE COURT: Read it one more time. I don't think it says quite what you said.

MR. EPSTEIN: "There is good cause to believe that immediate and irreparable damage to the Court's ability to grant effective final relief for consumers, including rescission or reformation of contracts and the refund of money or return of property" --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. EPSTEIN: -- "will occur."

That is monetary. That is the -- that is the consumer monetary relief.

The Supreme Court has drawn a very bright line between structural types of injunctive orders and orders that relate to monetary relief. Under 13(b), you can't enter a money judgment

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for restitution.

THE COURT: No, but I can protect the -- I can protect that money, which this injunctive relief does. I can't say you must pay it out or something of that nature, but I can protect it. If there's another lawsuit, they can -- they can, you know, do whatever they want with that money, or it may be released, I mean, but I'm not giving a monetary judgment, I'm just protecting.

MR. EPSTEIN: Well, but if you don't have the authority to give a monetary judgment, then what are you protecting it for? It's not got any use if there's not ever going to be a monetary judgment. You're just holding up their money in the absence of any use that the money could --

THE COURT: There may be a definite use for that money. If you read the receiver's report there's going to be, not a non- -- not a judgmental kind of judgment, kind of, but we don't know what's going on, so, I mean, I'm just giving you -- you know, I don't think that violates the Supreme Court. It may violate the Supreme Court if I were to distribute it or if I were to use it for something other than holding it to take a look in terms of what the receiver may need, where the -- where everything stands, where it came from. I mean, there's a big dispute in this -- in the pleadings in here as to YFI [sic] in terms of, you know, how they were related and not related and so forth.

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Anyhow, anything else? Why don't you wrap it up because it's getting late.

MR. EPSTEIN: Your Honor, this is a really key point.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. EPSTEIN: Because, remember, the asset freeze is the individuals. The asset freeze is the individuals, it's not the corporations. Rescission of contracts is the corporations. You've appointed a receiver over the corporations. The individuals can't give rescissionary relief; they're not parties to the contract, so it doesn't apply to that. And any -- any other monetary relief for consumers, again, isn't a Section 13 issue. There is a very recent decision from the 11th Circuit. There are no Sixth Circuit decisions on this, so, your Honor, respectfully, the 11th Circuit is essentially controlling law here.

I'm going to quote. It's Federal Trade Commission versus
On Point Capital Partners cited at 17 F.4th 1066, 2021. This
is the 11th Circuit speaking regarding this very issue. "As
monetary relief is no longer available under 53(b)", that's
Section 13(b) --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. EPSTEIN: -- "there is no need to preserve resources for a future judgment." Consequently, the imposition of an asset freeze or receivership premised solely on 53(b), not on facts, but on 53(b), which this one is --

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THE COURT: Not solely.

MR. EPSTEIN: -- is inappropriate.

THE COURT: This one is not solely?

MR. EPSTEIN: Yes, it is. There is no other basis that is cited in the order other than 13(b).

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. EPSTEIN: Now, the Commission may argue that 19(b) gives them scope here, but 19(b) has huge flaws. First of all, it is very limited in its scope. It only applies for the violation of a rule or -- for the violation of a rule here. It could also apply for the violation of a cease and desist, but there is none, so it has to be a rule violation. And this now goes back to the CROA argument. We will acknowledge that CROA is typically read as if it were a rule, but, again, if there is a legitimate debate over whether CROA, applies here because of the not-for-profit 501(c)(3) status, then it also can't really be the basis for the kind of relief that they're seeking here, plus the approach to calculating it is quite difficult. They've got to show individual consumer relief -- harm in order to get any kind of money judgment under 19(b).

THE COURT: Okay. We got to wrap it up. Give me your last, best argument.

MR. EPSTEIN: Okay. I would just also point out, in their reply brief, they cited to case Federal Trade Commission versus Noland, what we've referred to in our papers as

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Noland 2, as justifying this kind of relief under Section 19(b). What the FTC omits in their reference to this is really, really, really important, because it is the huge contradistinction between that case and this case.

In this case there's been no ruling on the facts, because you haven't been presented with the facts, so you've not determined the facts. In Noland, summary judgment on liability was entered against the defendants, so when they argued that AMG freed them of the asset freeze, then they were already facing a liability determination. That is the case that the FTC wants you to rely on, so if you rely on that and say it's applicable, you're making a finding of liability today on a preliminary injunction, which, I guess, goes without saying, is not proper, and we all recognize it's not proper.

THE COURT: We do? Who's all?

Okay. That's good.

Okay. Let me hear from anybody else, any of the other defendants wish to speak.

You can stay there or you can come to the podium, whichever makes you -- and give me your name, again, please.

MS. MESSNER: Good afternoon, I guess afternoon now, your Honor. I'm Lisa Messner. I'm going to make some remarks on behalf of my clients which are the individual defendants, Michael Toloff and Christopher Toloff, and on behalf of one of the corporate defendants, CM Rent, and I will, out of

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efficiency for the Court, not overlap any of my remarks with those of Mr. Epstein.

THE COURT: Thank you.

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MS. MESSNER: So, specific to Christopher Toloff, there are a lot of allegations in the complaint and in the filings by the FTC that just have factual inaccuracies to the individual defendant, Christopher -- I'll just refer to him as In the time that he worked there, he had kind of Christopher. a couple of different titles, and I think the last one was chief financial officer. It was a title, and in reality, it was a total only. His job duties were really more in the nature of operating the finances of the company, paying vendors, reconciliating [sic] the books, administering payroll, things of that nature. He had no actual decision-making authority within the company. And I just want to highlight that we have briefed that. We've provided the case law to the Court in our briefs that talk about how that analysis on individual liability does not end with just the title. It does have to actually look to the -- to the job duties of the individual defendant.

And then I just wanted to briefly respond to the Court. I know you had indicated, your Honor, that you just had an opportunity to skim through the FTC's response last night, but they do cite --

THE COURT: No, this morning, but go on. They just 22-11120; FTC v. Financial Education Services, Inc., et al.

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handed it to me this morning.

Go on.

MS. MESSNER: This morning, right.

The FTC cites three cases in there to suggest that the title alone is determinative for the Court in terms of looking at individual liability. I would just note for the court that those three cases are FTC versus Ross, FTC versus EMA

Nationwide, and FTC USA Financial, and in each of those instances, there's a very marked factual distinction between this case in that those corporate officers had authority to borrow funds on behalf of the companies. They had the authority to sign corporate resolutions on behalf of the companies. They had personally been involved with the actual creation of the product, services or advertisements that were alleged and found to have been violative of the Act, and so we would just highlight for the Court that the case is relied upon in the filing, the most recent filing by the FTC as to the individual defendant, Christopher Toloff, are distinguishable.

And you heard Mr. Epstein talk about how under Section 19 -- he explained the different between 13 and 19 -- in the event that the Court does rely on Section 19 in making any determinations as to the preliminary injunction specific as to the individual defendant Michael Toloff, that Section 19 carries a three-year statute of limitations. The reason that that is significant as to the individual defendant, Michael, is

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that he actually retired and sold his interest in FES in May of 2019. He was diagnosed with a long-term medical condition and that just became, you know, the reality for him, but given that, the three-year statute of limitations captures him for only about three months, four months' time period, and in that three- or four-month time period within the FTC submissions, there's no quantification of what damage might actually -- what consumer harm might actually exist during that time.

And then, lastly, as to our corporate defendant, CM Rent, this is a company that is somewhat of a stand-alone company from the other entities. It is based out of Colorado, and the company's objectives are to report rental income data to the credit reporting agencies, and in the FTC's original submissions, there is information that is submitted by the FTC that is the declaration of at least one witness is just demonstrably false. The declaration that was submitted by Lisa Willis of Equifax contains the statement that they've never had a relationship with CM Rent and that they never took this rental reporting income as --from this furnishing, and that's not true. They signed a contract with CM Rent in 2021 that has been proffered to the Court as part of our filings, and you will see it within the evidence that we've presented.

Significantly, the FTC didn't even refute that in the filing that they submitted last year.

And the other two filings we would just highlight don't 22-11120; FTC v. Financial Education Services, Inc., et al.

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present to the Court credible evidence, and I'll just highlight briefly why that would be: First, a declaration was submitted by the FTC of Ethan Durham with FICO, and he essentially says rental history is not significant under the FICO scoring mechanism, is inconsistent with the statements within his own declaration to the point that every scoring program of FICO since 2014 has had rental history as a factor, and that 35 percent of a person's FICO score under any scoring mechanism is based on payment history.

So we just would highlight those issues for the Court, and then, lastly, we would point out that, similarly, the FTC submitted a declaration from Marianne Litwa of TransUnion, and although she does not include this within her declaration, TransUnion has also contracted with CM Rent to receive the furnishing of the rental information.

And then, lastly, I would conclude as to CM Rent that your Honor has in front of him in the submissions, the declaration of Dr. Jovanovic in which he opines about many, many different things, but specific to CM Rent he discusses white paper and historical data to strongly suggest that rental income is an extremely important furnishing to the credit reporting agencies, particularly for persons who have traditionally been not having the same equal access to credit, and that would be people typically in a lower socioeconomic status that have limited access to credit and affordable housing, and all of

Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction Thursday/June 30, 2022 Page 41 that information is before your Honor in our submissions, and otherwise I will rest on my remarks and ask if you have any questions that I might answer for you. THE COURT: No, I don't at this time. Thank you very MS. MESSNER: Thank you so much. THE COURT: Anyone else? Please. And may I have your name one more time. MS. MAC MURRAY: May it please the Court, my name is Helen Mac Murray, and I want to speak to the motion for limited modification of the TRO. THE COURT: You know, yeah, I was going to do that separately. MS. MAC MURRAY: Okay. THE COURT: Because I have not -- it just came in, too, and I just looked at it very quickly, but it's an issue I want to talk about, but let's get our primary issue out of the way first and then intend to talk about that one. MS. MAC MURRAY: That's fine. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Does the --

Come on. It's okay.

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much.

MR. MORGAN: All right.

THE COURT: Your name again one more time.

MR. MORGAN: Kerry Morgan appearing on behalf of defendant Gerald Thompson who's in the courtroom today, your

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today.

Honor.

Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction Thursday/June 30, 2022 Page 42 THE COURT: Great. I always like the clients here because then they know what's going on, so --MR. MORGAN: Well, he's a transactional guy so I had to kind of show him how to get through security and everything. THE COURT: Right, the whole show. MR. MORGAN: I had to say, don't stand up and say "That's not true" or something like that, so --THE COURT: You have to show him how to practice law. That's what trial attorneys say, you got to tell the transactionals how to practice law. MR. MORGAN: There you go. THE COURT: Okay, Kerry. MR. MORGAN: Your Honor, we filed a brief, Document No. 50, and said, I think, what we should have said. We also filed a supplemental declaration of Mr. Thompson last night, which underscores a few of the things I want to mention here Mr. Thompson is in this suit essentially because he was

the president of YFL, the non-profit, the 501(c)(3) exempt nonprofit, but what I think is not well appreciated is the fact that he's also an attorney. He's licensed in the state of He's a P29003. I know you probably know where that Michigan. fits into the hierarchy.

> THE COURT: I'm P13221, so --

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MR. MORGAN: All right. So you got yours when they first started giving out Bar numbers.

THE COURT: I did.

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MR. MORGAN: I'm not quite there. I'm in the 32000s, but he's been around. And being a transactional lawyer, he represents clients that do nonprofit, that do IRS tax exemption, bylaws, articles, contracts, the usual stuff you would always expect a competent transactional attorney to perform. And, in fact, he did perform those functions for some of the corporate defendants here, YFL and FES. And he originally billed for those through his law firm. He and his father were originally a law firm together, he practiced law before he passed away, and to have more of an administrative convenience, they set up a retainer agreement where Mr. Thompson would be paid monthly for providing legal The receiver, in his report at page 35, notes that Mr. Thompson is an attorney and does provide services, and I don't think that's generally disputed, but in the Government's case, they look upon Mr. Thompson's conduct in whatever he does is all under his president hat, not under his lawyer, arm's-length, providing legal services hat. And, of course, as an attorney, I would hope that the Court would see that the practice of law doesn't really come within the regulation of the FTC. I did review the supplemental brief filed by the Government, and they talk about Mr. Thompson on page 24 and

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they state, "Additional evidence supports the requested relief against Thompson and Christopher Toloff."

THE COURT: So what you're asking today is to exclude Mr. Thompson from any relief I may give or not give?

MR. MORGAN: I don't think he should be in this case, your Honor.

THE COURT: I don't know about in the case, I'm just talking about today the issue is whether or not we should --

MR. MORGAN: I would ask that --

THE COURT: You would say that you would like -based on his professional services and so forth, that he should
be an excluded person from this particular, if I was to enter a
preliminary injunction, I can't do anything about the case. Is
that basically your bottom line?

MR. MORGAN: The scope of relief, yeah, the TRO and the preliminary injunction.

You didn't happen to see my notes before I got up here, did you?

THE COURT: No, I didn't, but I know that makes good sense. It's a good argument.

Let me look at the plaintiffs. You would have no objection to that as to him only as to the injunctive relief, would you?

MR. ASHE: Actually, we would respond that, you know, there is no attorney exception in Section 5.

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THE COURT: I'm not making that ruling, I'm making a ruling just based upon an attorney's relationship with the client, it's probably -- he didn't intend to be in part of this, and he still has to be part of the lawsuit, because I can't make a factual -- but I think it makes some sense just to exclude him from any relief that the Court may or may not give.

MR. ASHE: Obviously that's, you know, in the Court's discretion.

THE COURT: Good. If I decide to give some relief,
I'm going to exclude him based upon his attorney-client. And
he'll still be part of the case and I'm sure he'll file the
appropriate motions and stuff.

MR. MORGAN: So, your Honor, if I --

THE COURT: You don't have to argue --

MR. MORGAN: You know, my years of practice tell me
to sit down right now.

THE COURT: Yes, right. As they say, when you're winning, have a seat.

MR. MORGAN: I just wanted to let you know my client, you know, it's like, I'm doing my job, so --

THE COURT: No, no, I agree with you. You did a good job. You pointed out the things that I wanted to know about, and I have heard that argument in other kinds of cases, and I tend to say we're going to assume that he was acting in his attorney role. I suspect he was getting paid in his -- but

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that's not here nor there, and I don't think that excluding him has any bearing on anything at this point.

MR. MORGAN: And he was not even a paid -- he received no compensation.

THE COURT: Okay. You won. Your winning, so --

MR. MORGAN: Thank you, your Honor. I'll sit down and hopefully my client will pay me for all this.

MR. EPSTEIN: This is our only opportunity to talk to you. If I could get a couple more minutes, I wanted to finish the point on the statistics that I had started on you asked about, I didn't finish that, and I wanted just to point out a couple of things about the receiver's report as you go through that, because you're obviously going to place great weight on it.

THE COURT: Great weight.

MR. EPSTEIN: Okay. If you can just give me three, four minutes.

THE COURT: Go on. Three, four minutes.

MR. EPSTEIN: Now we had gone back -- the reason I come back to 2015 and came up with the numbers that I did, 623,000 customers since 2015, is that yesterday the FTC filed a spreadsheet that showed their complaints since 2015, a total --

THE COURT: I have not seen it, but go on.

MR. EPSTEIN: Yeah, it's in there. That's why this is a pertinent observation.

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So they start January of 2015, they run it through January They show 454 complaints during that time, so I asked the client, you know, we already have the numbers for '18, '19 and -- strike that -- '19, '20 and '21, what are the other numbers? Turns out that during the period of time that the consumer sentinel report, that's their consumer complaint portal, provides the 454 reports, they had 62 -- 623,000 customers enrolled during that period of time. The number of complaints that they are showing there -- now, it may not be the entire universe of complaints, but if it is to be given 454 complaints amounts to point -- I believe. Could be off a digit -- .007 percent, seven 1000ths of a percent of the customers. Could be seven 100ths, but I'm not real good with this calculator, so an infinitesimal number of complaints versus customers. If you add the agents to it, a discrete group, it's 881,000 discreet individuals, it drops done to .005 percent, five 1000ths of a percent. You're being asked to make a determination of a likelihood of success on the merits on a number of complaints -- this is the only evidence you have of any wrongdoing -- a number of complaints that doesn't even go to the left of the decimal point. So we're saying, this is -- you know, and, of course, the same thing could be said about ours. We put in 14 -- excuse me -- 16 that said wonderful things about the company. There's a lot of people out there that haven't said anything about the company.

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But all it's saying to you, Judge, is that you don't have enough to make any determination as to likelihood of success on the merits, because if you just balance our declarations against theirs, they cancel each other out and there's nothing.

Now, the second thing, be very careful about this receiver's report. I am going to ask the Court to not go to the end and see how the book ends, go on and see what the conclusion is, because --

THE COURT: I've already read it.

MR. EPSTEIN: -- in our view, the conclusion is completely disconnected from the body of the report.

At about a dozen places, the receiver talks about the procedures, the programs, the policies that are already in place. Talks about the Georgia consent agreement that was entered into in July of 2019. He says that the Georgia consent agreement, about it, he says the company has complied with it. They have done the things that the state of Georgia told them to do that they agreed to do. They've done those things. That's not a company that is permeated by widespread fraud, it's a company that follows the directions it's given by a regulator.

There's --

THE COURT: Okay. Two minutes.

MR. EPSTEIN: -- policies and practices -- here's the basic premise. The receiver has told you in this report

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there's an infrastructure in place, a good infrastructure, one that would be -- that would be capable of running a business legally -- not that it's not being run legally. So it's This isn't one of these that there's nothing already there. there. The entire infrastructure is in place. They even talk about, you know, the vetting of advertising. Didn't say that it's not being done, it says that there's not enough people So what does that tell you, your Honor? It tells you that if you have the infrastructure in place, you have the policies, you just need to staff it up. And there's plenty of ways to do that, and what that means is that the company gets to make that decision. The decision of how to implement the existing policies belongs to the company. The decision at the conclusion as to whether this can make a profit, that is a decision for the companies to make, not for a receiver or the Federal Trade Commission to make.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. EPSTEIN: Thank you.

THE COURT: Commission have any rebuttals, any short rebuttal?

MR. ASHE: It'll be short, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. ASHE: I would like to just start off, with respect to CM Rent and the declaration from Equifax, I guess we have a little egg on our face on that one. Equifax is a big

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company and I don't believe it was intentional on the part of Ms. Willis, who is a corporate officer, that they may have overlooked that, but, you know, I certainly apologize to the Court if that statement turned out to be inaccurate. I don't think it changes anything. It doesn't change, certainly, what the FICO declaration talks about, that even if the rent is being reported, it's only going to -- it's only a small part of what goes into the FICO score. You know, we certainly think, you know, reporting rent's important, and we're glad FICO is finally doing it. I think what -- something about the FICO scores. FICO 8 -- they have numbers -- FICO 8 and before, rent was not reported to it. Starting in FICO 9, it is. lenders still use FICO 8, but that's -- the main thing I wanted to say, and maybe the Court doesn't need to hear more on this, is two points, one on the nonprofit status, and the second on the AMG issue.

I think the defense seemed to conflate -- the First Circuit in Zimmerman versus Cambridge Credit Counseling says that the language of CROA, it's two parts, nonprofit and 508. You know, they've read that -- every district court, you know, that it's interpreted, said it's two parts: You have to be nonprofit and you have to be 501(c)(3) exempt. You know, for purposes of this position, we concede that, you know, it's up to the IRS to determine 501(c)(3) status, but the courts have long held that whether it operates as a non-property is an

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issue for the Court, and the record is clear that it is, and I think just -- I know we have in our brief, but I think it's worth repeating, even the defendants, you know, recognize that they're elevating, you know, form over substance. In February 2022, Mr. Michael Toloff says, you know, "Knowing that a hundred percent of our agents market the credit product and most of our customers are using the credit product, can we get away with it. This only concerns us if the FTC or Protection Bureau ever hit us. Now they may never have and -- they never have and they never. Let's hope that is the case. States, not a problem. We can win that battle because they cannot dig that deep."

Later they said, "We're not going to mention anything about credit. The less they know, the better. That will fit well in case any regulators question it. To a regulator, all the money is still going to the nonprofit. This will be a hundred percent internal, no one on the outside will know."

In another email, "We can still move money back and forth intentionally without anyone knowing, but I just don't think any regulator will buy the nonprofit is doing the credit repair."

So, clearly, they even know that this is all one big operation that is subject to CROA.

Briefly on the AMG issue, just to clear it, because it is, I think, a little bit confusing. So, yes, the Supreme Court 22-11120; FTC v. Financial Education Services, Inc., et al.

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last year ruled that under 13(b) of the FTC Act, the FTC cannot seek money for violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act. The Supreme Court said nothing about our ability to seek money under Section 19, which is for violations of rules. So clear the TSR falls under that.

In the statute of CROA, Congress expressly states that for purposes of FTC enforcement, a violation of CROA is deemed a violation of a trade regulation rule. So, therefore, Section 19 allows us the ability to seek monetary relief for violations of CROA.

With respect to the issue at hand whether an asset freeze should be in play, the court in Noland, which the fact that it was summary judgment on liability had been issued is a distinction without a difference in the case. What the Court held, as long as the Commission has a nonfrivolous argument for monetary relief, which we do here, because this Court can enter monetary relief under Section 19; therefore, it is appropriate, as this Court, you know, pointed out earlier, to preserve assets, and Section 13(b) gives that authority to enter the injunction of the asset freeze to preserve the ability for Section 19 later on, because, as this Court pointed out, this is not a final ruling on the merits, this is just is there a likelihood of the success on the merits, and, you know, unless the Court has any further issues --

THE COURT: No, thank you.

Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction Thursday/June 30, 2022 Page 53 1 MR. EPSTEIN: Your Honor, if I may. 2 THE COURT: No. 3 MR. EPSTEIN: What I just heard from Mr. Ashe is that 4 they're seeking an amendment, an effective amendment to the 5 TRO. 6 THE COURT: It's okay. That's okay. 7 MR. EPSTEIN: It doesn't cite to Section 19, and he 8 wants to support it on that basis. Is he moving to amend? 9 THE COURT: It doesn't make any difference. 10 Have a seat, please. 11 MR. ASHE: One more point. Since we're at the 12 conclusion of the issue of the preliminary injunction hearing, 13 we know that the temporary restraining order, I believe, and 14 correct me if I'm wrong, expires today, and I'm assuming the 15 Court's going to take this under advisement, so we ask that the 16 TRO be --17 THE COURT: I'm not taking it under advisement, I'm 18 going to rule in about --19 MR. ASHE: Oh, well, never mind. 20 THE COURT: -- as soon as Mr. Epstein sits down. 21 Okay. Hold on one second. I have to first take my pill. 22 I'm sorry. That's how I know what time it is every day, 23 it rings at 12:30. 24 This is a very unusual case for me because I 25 can't -- can say that I've never had anything close and I've 22-11120; FTC v. Financial Education Services, Inc., et al.

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never had a FTC case before and I've done a lot of reading, that's for sure, because each side has done a lot of filing. I've looked at everything and I've thought about things. I've listened to the arguments on the defense side and also read everything that the plaintiffs have to say, and it's just interesting because I've learned a lot, and the receiver, I believe, did a fabulous job, also, in putting things together.

We know that injunctive relief is extraordinary relief. It's the kind of relief that the Court has to think about, the Court has to justify, the Court -- it's relief that should not be given until such time as there's adequate reason to do so. And then I started thinking about, especially listening to the argument today, what standard. You know, when I was putting this together in my mind, what standard do I use? Do I use by preponderance of the evidence? But I don't have any evidence so I can't use preponderance of the evidence, all I have are pleadings, and pleadings, as we all know, are not evidence. I have affidavits that are disputed, so what do I use as a factor?

Most cases that I've always had in terms of injunctive relief have been, you know, kind of cut and dry. A broker leaves their firm and the firm sues them because they violated their noncompete clause and they want an injunction for their book of business, those kind of injunctions. Or where there's -- they come in and there's a really [sic] safety

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hazard. This is one that is based upon a lot of statutory as well as case law as well as administrative law, and I think, whether it is a complicated case like this one or it is a simple case, I think that there's still four factors, injunctive relief. It doesn't make any difference what kind of case it is or how much money is involved or whether there's no money involved but there's other things involved, so I still use the four factors. And, again, using the four factors in this case and using a standard, something less than -- or I shouldn't say less, but some standard, you know, of putting it all together.

So I first look at the likelihood of success, and I, at this point I've heard -- I've read first and, of course, heard argument today of each side. I think I heard your opening statements today. And I don't think one side or the other has more of a likelihood of success than the other. I think it is a complicated case. I think there's lots of rules and regulations and things that are involved. And the other thing is, is that we have multiple entities, and that's why when counsel was arguing about the status of whether it's nonprofit or profit and the Government is saying that, you know, hey, they're facilitating this, no matter what it is, they're facilitating, basically, is what they're saying. So I don't think there's any more likelihood or non-likelihood for either side at this point. The irreparable harm is -- and, again,

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there's -- the plaintiff alleges irreparable harm to the community and to those persons that are involved and credits in seeking their credit scores to be higher so that they have an opportunity to be able to function in terms of loans or rents and so forth, but also we have -- so that's -- we have irreparable harm also to the defendants. They have a business and I've read the report of the receiver, and the receiver's bottom line is, he doesn't believe that it can be run at this point. But they have a -- they have a core there already, and so I think that there is going to be irreparable harm to both sides and I'm very concerned about both sides. I won't lie to you, I'm very, very concerned about the public and the allegations that are made by the plaintiffs in this matter, but if I were not to issue any extraordinary relief in this matter, I have another solution to that, and I would imagine that with all the allegations that are made in this lawsuit, that there's -- that everybody is going to be straight and forward because everybody would be looking at them, the plaintiffs as well as each defendant and so forth, and we all know what's happening.

So I think there is irreparable harm to both sides, very frankly, and I don't know if the harm to the public is going to continue, or the harm to the system, and there is harm to the system. The Federal Trade Commission has a statutory obligation to do certain things, but I don't think that

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anything after what's been filed here and what we've heard here in open court and what we see in the orders and what we've seen in the affidavits and we've seen in the statistics and we've seen in the report of the receiver, that it's likely at all that anything that may have been done -- and I'm not saying there was anything done at all. I have no idea. I'm not here to do the facts. The jury will tell us what the facts are, but I don't think there's any -- any chance of anything to continue with all the eyes and ears that are going to be on this case.

The equitable balances, I mean, I think that, again, the equitable balance is very strong on the Government because that's their duty and they are out there to protect certain things that no one else can do but the Government. But, again, the equities of the defense also have equities, and their equities are that they have a business. If it's run illegally, as I indicated before, it's not going to be from this day forward, for sure, because there's a lot of eyes and ears on that business, and in the public interest -- and I think the public interest -- we always talk about the public interest. The public interest, yes, is usually, you know, the enforcement of regulations and laws and making sure that that which is alleged in this complaint does not happen. But we also have a public interest of promoting entrepreneurial endeavors and we have public interest in allowing people to conduct their business in a lawful manner. And, again, I say lawful, because

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I'm not saying this was unusual or anything else, but, again, I presume it's going to be totally lawful after today because everyone's going to be watching. And I'm not saying that anything happened before.

So I think the solution is to convert the receiver to a monitor, and I'm going to appoint the receiver as a monitor so that we have a situation where, as I indicated, we know that both sides are adequately protected -- and I said both sides have to be protected -- and I think that the receiver -- and I compliment Mr. Miles. I think he did a lot of work and his staff did a lot of work, and I think he'll be an excellent monitor because now he knows everything about it and he's had experts with him and so I am going to appoint him as a monitor. And we can talk about what a monitor's obligation or, you know -- but I think we all know it's monitored to make sure that the businesses are being conducted according to the law, that he may speak to each side ex parte, he may, you know, gather you together to speak and so forth.

And if you want to try between yourselves putting together an order, that's fine; if not, we'll put together an order. But the reason for the monitor is two-fold: No. 1, to satisfy the obligation to the Court under the injunctive relief to satisfy -- to protect the public and to protect -- when I say "the public," the defendants are public too, so both sides. I think it's one of those win/win situations. And so I will

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appoint him there. That -- his fee will -- if there's money in the pot, so to speak, his fee will come out of that. If there's no money in the pot, then the plaintiffs and defendants will split his fee, but from what I've read, there's some money in the pot, so I don't think it's going to be a problem.

Mr. Miles, are you willing to accept as the monitor?

MR. MILES: Your Honor, I am.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. MILES: I have experience being a monitor.

THE COURT: That's even better.

MR. MILES: I understand my role perfectly well. And when I was U.S. Attorney, I appointed monitors.

THE COURT: That's right. I forgot. That's right. So we have a perfect candidate.

And your report was excellent.

MR. MILES: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: So, Mr. Epstein?

MR. EPSTEIN: Defendants are fine with that, your Honor. I suggest, since we've all done this before, that we have a meet and confer amongst the three of us, of our group and the FTC, come up with the terms of the monitorship order. I think we can do that.

THE COURT: Good. And Mr. Miles, I'm sure, has a lot of experience in doing this, so why don't you do that. Let's say within the next 10 days, that should -- we have the holiday

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coming, so let's say two weeks, because I know we're closed tomorrow and so -- within two weeks present an order, but Mr. Miles may continue as he's doing now but as a monitor, so --

MR. EPSTEIN: All right. So as of today on the basis of the order, he's now been denoted as the monitor so that the parties can then retake possession --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. EPSTEIN: -- of business in his oversight.

THE COURT: Yeah. He'll -- he's the monitor, so you can't just all of a sudden he'll tell you how to do it. And you guys will figure it out. And the temporary restraining order is -- it expires today, anyhow.

MR. EPSTEIN: Yeah, I just wanted to make sure, as of today, the transition will occur as of today, even in the absence of the written order based on the oral order that you made today?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. EPSTEIN: Thank you.

THE COURT: Tomorrow, you know, commerce is closed, so it'll take two weeks to get everything organized. Okay?

And then we have not done a scheduling conference, and we can do that -- I wanted this in person. We can do that by Zoom. And I'll -- maybe you can put together -- you guys know more about the Rule 26, and now I like to do scheduling

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conferences in person because I like to see the people, but I've seen everybody today and I'm glad to have seen you.

Yes.

MR. MILES: Your honor, just to clarify on the point that counsel just made about effectiveness of the transition, because, as a receiver, we took control of the company, obviously, and all of its assets and accounts.

THE COURT: Right. It'll take you a while to --

MR. MILES: Right.

THE COURT: That's why I said within the two weeks -you're still the receiver until we get the monitor in place,
because otherwise things would be crazy. You'll notify the
banks and each side and so forth.

MR. MILES: Thanks for that clarification, your Honor.

MR. EPSTEIN: What's going to be -- presumably -- you haven't said it out loud yet, but presumably, the motion to convert to a preliminary injunction is denied in part, granted in part to appoint the monitor, but the injunctive provisions -- there's two parts of it, the injunctive provisions and the asset freeze that you have not addressed. Can we assume --

THE COURT: Those also, as of today, are subject to the receiver doing it in an orderly fashion. That's why I'm saying, it's as of today, but the receiver has jurisdiction to 22-11120; FTC v. Financial Education Services, Inc., et al.

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do it, so it make take two weeks to do it. I'm not -- you know, I don't want somebody running to the bank and say -- you know, the receiver will do it. He'll contact the bank. He'll do all the things that are necessary to unwind the temporary restraining order as of today. That means, like, if there's an obligation or something that's next week and he hasn't had a chance to do it, it's still the obligation. I can't think exactly of all the things, but it can't happen all of a sudden; it's going to take --

MR. EPSTEIN: No question there's going to be some time involved, because mechanically in order to free up accounts, things like that, we're going to need your order.

THE COURT: I know. And also we're going to need the receiver, now the monitor, to facilitate it.

MR. EPSTEIN: And that's as to the companies, but as to the individuals --

THE COURT: Individuals, all you need is my order.

MR. EPSTEIN: Yeah, we just need your order.

THE COURT: And as soon as we get the order, we'll sign it.

Anything else?

Okay, let's do a Zoom scheduling conference. I think it's better. Why don't you guys meet and confer, do all the things in 26, see how much time you need for certain things, you know, and then we can talk about it.

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MR. EPSTEIN: I'm about to embarrass myself because I normally do this right first thing or have my trusty associate do it, but we didn't check your website. Do you have a form of a case management report or Rule 26(f) order --

THE COURT: We do.

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MR. EPSTEIN: -- that you prefer?

THE COURT: It's on there. As I say, often do them, anyhow, because I like to see who we're doing it with. Here we may not need a meeting together. You guys can put it together. Oftentimes I'm asked, how much time can we have? I say, take as much time as you need, but once we get dates, I don't adjourn them because I don't have a trailing docket. You know, allow time in there for discovery and vacations and your family and all that stuff, because once we get discovery over, we'll give you a date, a motion cutoff date, and at the same time you'll get a pretrial conference for the trial and a trial date, and our trial dates, those are them. Sometimes we're off a day, maybe two days, but I used to hate trailing dockets. You tell the client, hey, we're going to trial on a certain date, maybe. You know, you get all your witnesses lined up. So we give definite dates. It's good for the attorneys. And my wife calls them spending dates because I have two weeks free because we thought -- you know, it settled and we couldn't finish it up so we'll go shopping and have a good time, so .

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important thing.

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Okay. Oh, and the other thing is, any time that you have something you want to talk to me about, I'm always willing to take a phone call or Zoom. Rather than you spend a whole lot of money and time filing motions or, you know -- and I assume you guys -- guys and ladies -- are going to get along. know, civility in practice is important. You know, sometimes you make a phone call, we'll talk about it and you solve it. If it's something you can't solve, you know, rather than spending time on filing motions, if I'm here, we'll talk about them. I want to save as much time and money for everybody and then we'll go from there. Anything you need, though, before you start filing motions and stuff, call here and we'll --MR. EPSTEIN: Is there any particular format you have for discovery motions? Do you like a pre-motion --THE COURT: No, no. I'm not like New York. MR. EPSTEIN: -- anything like that? THE COURT: In fact, we have a case in New York. No. We have to --MR. EPSTEIN: New York -- lots of places --California. THE COURT: Yeah. I mean, I didn't know California, but, you know, they -- you got to look at it before it can be filed and, no, we don't do that. Thank you very much. Stay safe that's the most

Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction Thursday/June 30, 2022 Page 65 1 MR. EPSTEIN: Thank you, your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Thank you. 3 4 CERTIFICATION 5 I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcription of 6 the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. 7 8 7/6/2022 s/ Timothy M. Floury, CSR-5780 Timothy M. Floury, CSR-5780 Date 9 Official Court Reporter 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 22-11120; FTC v. Financial Education Services, Inc., et al.